PKSOI BULLETIN

Volume 2, Issue 1 *October 2009*

Director's Corner

One year ago, we introduced this Bulletin with the near-simultaneous release of the U.S. Army's FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*. Each quarterly edition since that time explored a particular theme that we believed would highlight or educate the peace and stability operations community while we absorbed and began implementation of our new military doctrine. To start the second year of the Bulletin, we decided to focus on "Mainstreaming Stability Operations." However, as our authors began to submit their work it became apparent that as a community, we are still defining what that means with little consensus concerning how we best accomplish this.



COL John Kardos,
Director PKSOI

Does "mainstreaming" stability operations demand changes to the way we (U.S. Army, U.S. military, U.S. government) do business? Is transformational change required or is it sufficient to simply "work at the margins"? What needs to be changed? (Force structure? Doctrine? Training? Leader development and education?) Can we—should we—identify specific leader and/or functional competencies that are necessary or unique to conducting stability operations? Are there programs and budgets supporting these efforts, and how do they shape the discussion? What are our near- and long-term relationships with our civilian peers in peace and stability operations endeavors?

What do you think? Do you have something to say? Something to add to our Event list?

The next bulletin topic will look at Mainstreaming Stability Operations

Send your letter or articles for submission to PKSOI Publications Coordinator @ e-mail or through the "Contact Us" at the PKSOI Website no later than 15 September 2009 for our next Bulletin. Provide sufficient contact information. Bulletin Editor may make changes for format, length, and inappropriate content only and in coordination with original author.

There is no suspense for submissions related to our Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Topic List. You may send your manuscript directly to the Chief, Policy and Knowledge Management Division (PKM), PKSOI.

Contact us

If you are a "blogger" and would like to check out our blogs related to Peace and Stability Operations please visit our website and make comments. You may also visit our Book Review section where we feature comments by the author and topical Subject Matter Experts.

PKSOI Blogs Book Review

IN THIS ISSUE

We cannot answer all of these questions or their like in this issue. However, our authors do provide insights to add to the richness of the discussion. In two separate essays, Colonel Bryan Groves and Lieutenant Colonel Cesar Padilla share their perspectives on the proposed future of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs structure. Lieutenant Colonel David Kosinski describes some of the findings regarding interagency coordination and planning from exercise Austere Challenge 2009, and offers recommendations for the military to consider to "Bridge the Gap" with civilian agency peers. As a companion piece written by our Tufts University interns, we include a summary of observations concerning interagency collaboration from our own Stability Operations Lessons Learned Information Management System (SOLLIMS) that were gleaned from Austere Challenge 09 input and other 'open source' data. Nate Freier shares his thoughts—informed by his work related to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)—concerning why "mainstreaming stability operations" may be so difficult for the U.S. Army and the military in general. In addition, our book reviews for this quarter reflect on those same or similar challenges in history and in current campaigns.

Finally, we conclude with the announcement of the recently released *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, developed collaboratively by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and PKSOI. Published one year after the release of the U.S. Army's FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, the "Guiding Principles" present the first-ever, comprehensive set of shared principles for building sustainable peace in societies emerging from violent conflict. The manual serves as a tool for U.S. government civilian planners and practitioners who are engaged in stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) and it is a valuable resource for international actors and nongovernmental organizations. Today, civilian actors operate without the support of any unifying framework or common set of principles to guide their actions in these complex environments. As global demand for these missions continues to rise, this gap will impede the cooperation and cohesion that is needed across the peacebuilding community to ensure success of any S&R mission. This publication seeks to fill this gap, and in doing so the "Guiding Principles" and FM 3-07 effectively complement each other. (insert link to Guiding Principles paragraph and to FM 3-07)

By next quarter, we can expect the QDR report to be available. We will explore its directives and its impact on peace and stability operations in our next Bulletin.

"Mainstreaming" Civil Affairs Force Structure

by COL Bryan Groves

As this issue of the PKSOI bulletin speaks to the mainstreaming of Stability Operations, it is worthwhile at this point to also consider mainstreaming Civil Affairs (CA) force structure. Taken to the logical—and not-so-extreme—mainstreaming CA structure may involve adopting a recommendation by Dr. John Bonin of the United States Army War College. He argues that CA companies should be made organic to brigade combat teams (BCTs) in the active component (AC) and Army National Guard (ARNG) while retaining the existing United States Army Reserve (USAR) CA structure for echelons-above-brigade.

These echelons-above-brigade elements include Joint-Combined Civil Military Operations Task Forces (JCMOTFs), Ministerial Advisory Teams (specifically civilian ministries) as well as service in both provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and some of the new State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) structures [such as advanced civilian teams (ACTs) and forward advanced civilian teams (FACTs)]. While CA capabilities at those echelons and in those positions remain extremely useful to furtherance of United States government policy objectives, the CA capabilities would be of equal value and importance at the more tactical levels of military force structure as well.

As James Dobbins noted in "Retaining the Lessons of Nation-Building" that

> . . .by 2003, there was no army in the world more experienced in nation-building than the American, and no Western army with more modern experience operating within a Muslim society. How, one might ask, could the United States perform this mission so frequently, yet do it so poorly? The answer is that neither the American military nor any of the relevant civilian agencies had regarded post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction as a core function, to be adequately funded, regularly practiced, and routinely executed.

Adding CA company force-structure as organic to BCTs would go a long way towards enabling BCTs to address post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction as a core function, as expected by the U.S. Army doctrine.

CA Soldiers and officers receive extensive and intensive training in understanding and working with foreign cultures and in coordinating with civilian actors and executing core tasks such as support to civil administration. BCTs already have organic signal, engineer, military police, logistics and fire support. By making CA organic to the BCT, CA will be there for all pre-deployment training. While some have argued that AC CA should remain outside of the BCT construct to allow it to concentrate on regional expertise, it is fairly obvious that all BCTs will be rotating through Afghanistan and other parts of the Muslim world for years to come. Therefore, AC CA companies organic to BCTs can share their regional and cultural expertise with the rest of the Soldiers in their BCT, making them more effective in counterinsurgency and stability operations in a shorter period of time.

Although Dr. Bonin's suggestion is an excellent one, it does not address all of the shortfalls cited by James Dobbins and others regarding the abilities of today's Army to conduct stability operations. We also need to address a shortfall in critical "civilian" skills. I call them "civilian" because they are skills needed in most modern societies today. They are very much military skills as well. If our Army does not possess these skill sets, it cannot restore order after the battle, and as a result risks losing the final victory.

As our Army prepared for World War II, we may not have considered stabilization and reconstruction as a core function, but we considered it important enough to create the Civil Affairs and Military Police Corps under the aegis of the Judge Advocate General. In an era before "combat multipliers," "enablers" and "irregular warfare," senior Army planners recognized from our historical experiences—to include Mexico, our own failed reconstruction after our Civil War, our campaigns in the Philippines, and the post Great War famines in early twentieth century Europe—that we would do well to organize, train and resource formations to restore order after battle and look after the immediate needs of the civilian population that fell under our control.

Our CA forces in World War II were drawn, as the vast majority of the then newly expanded Army, from American civil society, and brought with them the civilian education, skills and experiences that would prove so valuable in rapidly repairing the sewers, water lines and electrical grid that had been destroyed by retreating Germans in Naples and other cities as we advanced up the Italian boot. Our ability to care for the civilian populace under our control addressed our own core values and helped keep these same civilians from interfering with our ongoing combat operations everywhere we fought in Europe and Asia during World War II.

Today, our Army is much smaller, both in numbers and as a percentage of the American population.

And while our Soldiers are drawn from the top 30% of their peers based on intellect and physical and moral fitness, they are trained to fight and win battles, not to build nations. They come to us out of high school and college without many of the experiences of the farm, the factory, the department of public works, or the Civilian Conservation Corps, that the Soldiers of the Greatest Generation took with them to Europe and Japan. This is true of most of our CA Soldiers, whether active and reserve, as well as the rest of our Army.

We have long relied on our reserve component to provide civilian skills needed for the Civil Affairs branch so that it could assist commanders meeting their legal and moral obligations to the civilian populations under their control in wartime and to carry out necessary stability tasks. The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg teaches officers and NCOs our basic Civil Affairs doctrine and qualifies them to serve as CA Generalists. It does not train them to serve as CA functional specialists. Many of our USAR CA units are being filled with good Soldiers and officers coming from AC units who have extensive experience fighting in a counterinsurgency environment and are more and more adept in dealing with civilians in foreign cultures, but they lack many critical civilian skills needed to successfully execute the finer and very critical details of stability operations. They are not CA functional specialists.

Who are these functional specialists? Within the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) and its USAR CA units there are 624 billets for experts in fourteen civilian skill sets: Public Administration, Environmental Management, Public Safety, Economic Development, Food and Agriculture, Civil Supply, Public Works and Utilities, Public Transportation, Public Communications, Public Health, Cultural Relations, Public Education, Civil Information and International Law. The end of the draft and the advent of a relatively large standing Army of career Soldiers trickled down into the Reserves, and within the CA community, many of these billets are filled by officers whom do not have the requisite civilian training or experience. However, these officers have shown a willingness to deploy repeatedly into harm's way. The Army would do well to provide them with the requisite training before testing them. USACAPOC should also be able to offer direct commissions at the field grade level to highly qualified civilians with the right credentials who are otherwise deployable and to fund contracts to officers who have deployed to OEF and OIF that would send them to graduate school to acquire the required skills in exchange for an additional service obligation.

In summation, just as stability operations are critical to achieving lasting peace, CA is critical to effective stability

For the Army to "mainstream" stability operations it must embed a CA capability down to the BCT level and it must restock its echelons above BCT CA formations with well-qualified CA functional specialists.

COL Bryan Groves became Chief, Civil-Military Integration at PKSOI in July, 2008. **E-MAIL**

New! United States Institute of Peace and PKSOI unveil new book titled: The Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction

The *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* presents the first-ever, comprehensive set of shared principles for building sustainable peace in societies emerging from violent conflict. The manual serves as a tool for U.S. government civilian planners and practitioners engaged in stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) missions and is a valuable resource for international actors and nongovernmental organizations. Today, civilian actors operate without the support of any unifying framework or common set of principles to guide their actions in these complex environments. As global demand for these missions continues to rise, this gap will impede the cooperation and cohesion that is needed across the peacebuilding community to ensure success of any S&R mission. The Guiding Principles seeks to fill this gap by providing:



- An overarching strategic framework for S&R missions based on a construct of End States, Conditions and Approaches.

- A comprehensive set of shared principles, distilled from the wealth of lessons that have emerged from past S&R missions.

This manual is a product of collaboration between the United States Institute of Peace and the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and reflects the input of dozens of institutions across the peacebuilding community. It is based on a comprehensive review of major strategic policy documents from state ministries of defense, foreign affairs, and development, along with major intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations working in war-torn areas around the globe.

National Defense University's Lincoln Hall
Fort Lesley J. NcNair, Washington D.C.

New! Conferences and Workshops

October 27-29, 2009 Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop

2009 Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop, The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) in concert with its co-sponsors: the National Defense University, Consortium for Complex Operations, George Mason University, United States Institute of Peace, US Army Combined Arms Center, State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and the Naval Post Graduate School; will conduct the Workshop at Fort McNair's Lincoln Hall from 27 to 29 October, 2009.

This annual event brings together education and training practitioners from the stability and peace operation community of practice and provides a forum to:

- Examine processes in order to create synergies among current education and training efforts
- Identify best practices
- Provide recommendations to improve peace and stability operations training and education programs.

For more information on the event please contact COL Main at 717-245-4479 **E-MAIL**

BRIDGING THE GAP

by LTC Dave Kosinski

Connecting Civilian Government and Military Partners

In spring of 2009, the United States European Command (USEUCOM) conducted a Joint Task Force (JTF) certifying exercise entitled Austere Challenge 09 (AC09). This exercise successfully identified some of the significant challenges that remain in getting an effective whole of government (WOG) approach to international situations of national interest and action. This article discusses the general circumstances of the exercise and poses some potential points to bridging the apparent gaps in meeting the challenges when connecting our United States (U.S.) civilian government and military partners.

What happened…

The primary purpose for AC09 was to evaluate the 7th United States Army, Europe (USAEUR) on its ability to conduct combat operations as a Joint Task Force (JTF). For this past year, the exercise designers, with the support of the Commander, incorporated a new, and extremely significant, element to the exercise: the implementation of the interagency management system (IMS) and the deployment of an Advance Civilian Team (ACT). Both the IMS and the ACT are products stemming from two of the most historic U.S. documents of the last decade – National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) - 44 and Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05 (recently re-released on 11 September 2009 as a DoD Instruction). These documents validate the need for a whole of government approach to crisis and authorized the development of government institutions and processes to methodize this WOG approach. They also reshaped the framework for military operations by making stability operations on par with offensive and defensive operations. This last thought, specifically, was not an unknown one within the Defense community, but appeared less understood and therefore less practiced.

This was not the first time that a Combatant Command (COCOM) integrated the IMS and ACT into an exercise. In 2008, Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) had a planning component of the IMS assist in their Blue Advance exercise. However, EUCOM's Austere Challenge is unique, thus far, in the scope, breadth and depth in which non-Department of Defense (DoD) actors participated in the exercise from design concept through execution.

It's not broke, really, so why are we fixing it?

To the casual observer, a conscious effort to get all of the US government agencies to work together may seem a simple project-- or even "not needed." If fact, one might even be inclined to believe that all government agencies inherently work together routinely because, after all, they all have the same boss – "the government". Therefore, one may argue, all one has to do is tell them to work together – right? Wrong.

The US government is composed of multiple agencies, each with different objectives, methods, funding and, by extension, very different personalities or organizational culture. For one to believe—or expect—a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) employee shares the same training, work process and organizational values as a soldier in the US military is grossly incorrect. Further, to attempt to define or direct one agency and its processes as "the best" and a standard model to which all others should conform to be both myopic and counter-productive to establishment of a collaborative WOG approach. In truth, each agency has its strengths and weaknesses as an organization, has processes based upon tried and successful methods, and has a cadre of well meaning, professional employees. Each agency is uniquely designed and managed to address their subject and functional area. Recognizing these truths is the first step toward building a mindset to promote a holistic approach. Problem solving is approached slightly differently by each agency and no one method is the only method to get to a solution. Given the myriad of organizational methodology, a cooperative system to *create* one vision and *connect* each agencies' methods to achieve that shared vision is the correct answer versus any attempt to *control* the agencies and *conform* their processes. In other words, we need ***structured*** *consensus* rather than *command and control*. The use of the word "structured" is both deliberate and key. While unconstrained discussion and debate during problem-solving sessions can yield the most holistic solutions and approaches, too much discussion and debate in problem-solving can also lead to either inaction or untimely action and, ultimately, the wrong results.

The IMS, IPC and the ACT

In order to create a unified vision from the national strategic level down to the tactical level, there appeared a need for a problem solving construct that all agencies of the USG (DoD being one of those agencies) could use. When the Department of State was given the lead to develop and implement this system, the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability (S/CRS) was created. This multi-agency body is tasked with executing WOG planning and operations when called upon. Acting under the direction of the National Security Council (NSC) and through committees of Principals, they translate national policy into strategic goals and objectives by an Integrated Planning Cell (IPC).

In turn, the IPC plans and monitors the implementation of the plan by the combined efforts of the ACT and Ambassador's Country Team. As stated earlier, the IMS is designed as a commonly understood and agreed upon problem-solving construct to be used by all agencies. In its current form, it generates Major Mission Elements (MME) (akin to military Lines of Operation) to structure the efforts into single WOG approaches. MMEs are further defined into a detailed analysis of the means, methods, timelines and costs to achieve short term (considered 1-5 years) stabilization. This plan is based upon their assessment of the root causes of the conflict which is done through another analytic process. To conduct the IMS, S/CRS relies on two organizational bodies – the IPC and the ACT. Both bodies have no set structure but are, instead, created based upon the requirement and availability of qualified personnel. As a planning body, the IPC works at the strategic level (such as the COCOM) and provides the initial plan, guidance and coordination required to enable the ACT to function. Once the ACT is manned and deployed to the location, the IPC takes on a role as an advisor, coordinator and communicator rather than as policy implementer.

The ACT is a multi-functional team similar to the Embassies' country team. It represents all agencies identified as critical to the situation and augments the Ambassadors' staffs to assist in stabilizing the crisis. Their focus is the crisis itself, freeing the Ambassadors' staffs to focus on normal operations beyond the crisis point.

Where's the Beef?

You may ask, where in the process is the military? Since the term "inter-agency" includes DoD, too (though "inter-agency" is commonly used by military personnel to describe everyone else), the military is already included in this process. The military brings with it tremendous capability for implementation of the created objectives. Whether the crisis is humanitarian in nature, such as post-tsunami, or more violent in nature, such as encroachment into the sovereign territory of an ally, the military is an integral part of the IMS process and of the WOG solution to the problem. In fact, in recent history, the military has almost been the sole solution, regardless of whether it was the "right" one. This is what both of the key documents mentioned in the beginning have started to change. There is no doubt that the military is required for any situation involving use of force to either solve the problem or to set the conditions for the problem to be solved. There is also a general agreement that whatever the military breaks, it will fix. However, when confronted with the current problem sets in the world today such as destabilized countries of little or no developed infrastructure or systems to enable them to recover from the physical, social and economic results of conflict, the military must be proficient in country building as well as combat operations.

If the drivers of conflict are not eliminated (and these drivers are not simply people that can be removed, but more situational or environmental, such as poverty or water scarcity), then there is either an open-ended military deployment or only a semi-completed mission. No matter how good the military becomes with post-combat stability operations, long term development is the job of other agencies and entities such as USAID in conjunction with the country team. How, then, does the military's immediate to one year vision (developed with one-year deployment tours) connect with the ACT/Embassy's three to five year vision? More so, how do military and non-military operational systems connect to track progress of planned objectives, funding expenditures, information requirements, etc?

Time for non-linear thinking

Current military doctrine dissects an operational timeline into five generally understood phases, where "phase three," (with it's dominate combat activity) is the most traditional and comfortable. Despite the military leadership's growing realization and a corresponding noble effort to recognize that all phases--or even just a few phases—may be happening simultaneously, there is still a lack of ability to translate that concept into the mechanics of operational motion. Common questions from military planners and operators include: "How do I know if I am in phase three or four"? Or "Can I go from four to three and what changes in the Joint Operations center (JOC)"? Or "What is actually battle-tracked in phase five (or in phase three to shape phase five)"? These questions illustrate the linear mind-set still prevailing in the military.

Further, the U.S. military exercise structure still looks like a football game moving left to right and down the field. First, there is a buildup of forces. Then, the first operation consists of a linear movement to defeat an enemy aligned in armored or vehicular formations. Once the enemy is pushed back or destroyed, the "whistle blows" and phase four begins. The new focus is to incorporate asymmetric threats as we move back and forth across the field. Especially in military exercise programs, we are very proficient in initially moving the "ball" down the field, but then tend to taper off or run out of time to address the hard issues that come in the post-phase three world or with asymmetric threats across the entire area.

It is time for a corresponding new exercise construct where we satisfy the initial phases that get us into a conflict (or potentially conflicted area) in support of the Embassy/IMS and then turn the situation up and down like a dimmer switch to test the entire spectrum of phase zero to five activities in a singular environment. The objective of this new paradigm is to truly test the mechanics of simultaneous civilian government and military solutions to problems as well as the capillaries that actually feed these solutions.

One of the roots to the slow growth of the WOG approach in exercises is that the civilian's government partners tend to "attach" on to an existing military exercise, rather than develop an exercise that brings the military to them. Being part of a military-sponsored and hosted exercise—with a military-dominated training audience—naturally moves us to a primary military solution and a non-military solution only as a by-product. Unless the military changes their construct as just described—or the civilian government partners develop their own training events and exercises—then we will naturally default to a linear military-led process that may/may not be an accurate test of WOG approaches and strategies. Given the fact that the civilian sector is not robust enough to participate in professional education and training at the depth that their military counterparts can, I believe that the answer for the next several years is that the military system must adapt to improve a number of their exercises to be more inclusive of our civilian government partners for the good of the "team".

The bridging points

AC09 was ground breaking in the involvement of the entire inter-agency through all facets of exercise design and execution. However, we can still get better. Though the formal after action review process is still on-going, there are some initial concepts that can be meaningfully addressed (in no particular priority).

Exercise design – As was alluded to earlier, the entire exercise construct requires examining and adapting to not only incorporate the entire IMS process in it, but to also give a JTF a better test of asymmetric threats over an extended period. Too much time is spent on RSOI and linear combat tactics to get into the real "messy" piece of current and future threats. Deeper than the conceptual design, experts are required to craft the detailed information that becomes critical during exercise play. "Soft" intelligence, infrastructural and environmental conditions (not just battle damage), key figures, role player support, response cells, etc, all become as significant in this type of scenario as enemy dispositions and compositions in a linear fight. Moreover, these new pieces are harder to build and prepare for. Role player dialogues can make or break a role playing event and require players consummate with the roles that are played. A reserve soldier on his two week advanced training may not be able to play the role of a foreign dignitary or ambassador unless, by chance, he has had some exposure to that level. Generally, this is not the case. The complexity of our exercises must increase as the complexity of the current operational environment increases.

Situational Awareness (SA) – The IMS is a revolutionary system that the U.S. Government is trying to implement. Unfortunately, it is not a well known system, yet. There are many people feverishly working on codifying and educating the entire inter-agency on this new paradigm. This will naturally take time because it constitutes a generational level of change in the military psyche. Senior officials will have a more difficult time moving away from the methods that provided success in the last twenty years. This is natural. However, we must continue to evolve to stay competitive and effective. Combating the limited SA on the IMS is already taking place through a scarce number of cooperative relationships that leaders like Lieutenant General Caldwell have developed. Mid and senior grade officers are serving in inter-agency positions at S/CRS to begin the cross cultural education of each other. Although a great start, the programs need to be expanded in depth and breadth. On a more local level, exercise academics are crucial to developing a functional understanding of how the specifics of the exercise will work. This is a prime place to emphasize and train individual staffs and people on the new structure. Once isn't enough, either. Repetition, just as we do in every other task, is required here throughout the entire exercise to reinforce the learning process. This education is not one sided, either. Just as the military participants need to understand the IMS process, the non-DoD agencies need to understand how the military conducts business so each can communicate and work with one another.

Communication – Not every agency conducts business with the Boards, Bureaus, Cells, Committees and Working Groups (B2C2WG) process and speaks Power-point. Therefore, groups may not understand the importance of how to get their point properly articulated into the military decision cycle. As most military know, if you aren't at the commander's briefing, you "don't exist". This is especially critical while we have the interagency process using military exercises as the learning conduit. Non-DoD participants must understand the military decision process and where they fit in to be effective. DoD organizations must understand that non-DoD processes don't necessarily function like military ones and that the twenty-four hour battle-rhythm or depict progress in "green/amber/red" slides. *Getting the mechanics of communication down is the single most important element to making this IMS work.*

Structure - Structure is not a fix for poor communication. One of the most significant gaps that developed during the exercise was one based on communication (or lack of). Although the IMS is not a mirror image of the military command structure, it has some close parallels. All agencies (including DoD, and namely OSD) are represented at the policy level in Washington. Further, each key element has a connecting body in an IMS situation (the Combatant Command has the IPC for planning and coordinating and the JTF has the ACT in conjunction with the Embassy). Each element has to ensure that there is communication up/down, left/right in order to maintain a synchronized effort.

In the case of AC09, a reactive measure to the perceived disconnect was to contemplate the creation of a new body to bridge communication gaps rather than fix the existing lines. Though there could be some validity in some situations to creating another body, there should be a hesitation to do this before exploring all venues to make the current structure as efficient as possible. Given today's declining resources in people and funds, more new structure can't be the first answer, but using existing structure better is.

As an example, a traditionally misunderstood and underutilized staff element at most levels is the C9. Chartered with the focus of civil-military operations, it is the connection point for the civilian players in the operation. Given the resources and authority, it provides the backbone for the coordination of Inter-agency efforts. For example, the C9 in at the Multi-national Corps Iraq Headquarters in 2006 consisted of nearly 100 people that had permanent representation in the embassy to enable information flow to the Corps. Further, almost daily coordination was done with government agencies such as USAID to synchronize development efforts. In effect, there was a duel effort with one staff section the lead for kinetic operations and another, the lead for non-kinetic. Unfortunately, the C9 at the JTF was decimated during the USAREUR transformation process after redeployment from Iraq in 2006 which seemed to have a direct effect on the exercise despite tremendous effort by the current C9. Current general purpose forces designs in Ft. Leavenworth have continuously marginalized the role of the C9 in creating an organic, consistent capability which will delay any long term change. Emphasis and empowerment of current structure as well as accelerated strategic efforts to refine Civil Affairs support to the GPF will greatly remedy shortfalls.

The glass is half full, but we need to fill it more.

With a continued injection of funding into S/CRS, the way ahead grows clearer. Future operations short of total war will require a WOG approach to solve effectively. This new process is in the best interests of national policy for it is the only way to provide a comprehensive approach that guarantees national will and resources versus military solutions that can be perceived incorrectly. The first steps of this process have been as significant as any first steps and must be supported as strongly.

Austere Challenge 09 was an incredible event and all of the exercise designers, participants and commands can be equally proud of their efforts. It is now the perfect time to seize the initiative, capitalize on the momentum and move the effort forward to a true WOG solution.

LTC Kosinski currently serves as the Senior Advisor, Army Integration within PKSOI. He is a career Active Duty officer and has served in various positions in the Infantry, as a FAO and within Civil Affairs

New! PKSOI Staffer Supports Operations in Afghanistan

COL Scott Wuestner and a local Afghan village elder share thoughts on the rebuilding of Afghanistan.

Colonel Scott Wuestner is the Chief, Operational Integration Division at PKSOI and was requested to assist the Director of Operations for RC-S in Afghanistan (Regional Command South). RC-S is a NATO headquarters that is transitioning from a coordinating headquarters to an operational division-type headquarters. Colonel Wuestner was asked to look at command and control, planning, processes and assessments within the headquarters and identify Best Practices used by other commands. He has numerous areas specific areas of interest such as SBCT (Stryker Brigade Combat Team) and SOF (Special Operations Forces) integration and civilian/military collaboration.

From Left to right: Senator Inouye, Commander of forces in RC-S Dutch Major General De Kruif, and Commander of Forces Afghanistan General McChrystal

The Right Fit: Civil Affairs Forces is a Conventional Irregular Warfare Capability

By LTC Cesar Padilla



The 2006 decision to separate Active Component (AC) Civil Affairs (CA) from its Reserve Component (RC) counterpart seems to be based on a view within the Department of Defense (DoD) at that time that CA was a predominant post-conflict capability. This opinion missed Civil Affair's relevance to Irregular Warfare (IW), which was just emerging as a major DoD policy objective in the same time frame. As the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) noted, IW is one of the most pressing challenges for US security. This article proposes that as a result of globalization IW is driven by persistent internal conflict in regions and countries vital to US "economic" interests. Irregular Warfare requires the US to conduct "population centric" operations to build host-nation capacity to govern and meet the needs of it citizenry. Civil Affairs is one of only a handful of DoD capabilities (others include Psychological Operations, Special Forces and Foreign Area Officers) that specifically focus on foreign civilian populations.[1] Apart from Special Forces, the other Army capabilities and functions are conventional. To engage the civilian population, CA specialists bring skills that are not unique to Special Operations but rather fall into a "gray area" that special operations operatives also use, such as diplomacy, language and cultural knowledge.

The CA specialty is unusual since the majority of its practitioners are citizen-soldiers who bring their civilian skills to the military (90% in the RC and 10% in the AC). If appropriately employed, CA can support missions from stability and reconstruction operations, humanitarian assistance or support non-combatant evacuation operations. The question remains, is CA conventional or special operations capability? This question is difficult because the answer may require DoD to heavily invest in and rebalance the CA force to execute IW missions required in the QDR. Recently the Department of the Army (DA) directed a review that addressed where to place command and control (C2) of Civil Affairs (CA) forces. The organizations tasked to respond are the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC).

There are essentially two choices. First, USASOC argues for maintaining the *status quo*, which keeps the active CA brigade under its own C2 and leaves the Reserve CA units (which are the majority of the CA force) under USARC's C2. Second, is to move away from the *status quo* and recognize that it is not in the best interests of the Army. The Army should have access to all available CA forces for supporting full spectrum operations without having to request support from two different commands. In an era of persistent conflict, CA operations are required in "peace time" as shaping operations, independent of other forces (SOF or GPF) and part of a civil-military team under interagency operational control.[2] This article argues that civil affairs operations are a conventional capability that supports population-centric operations described in both Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations doctrine. The history of Civil Affairs operations points to the conventional nature of CA.

In 1943 the War Department established the Civil Affairs Division to conduct the difficult tasks of post war reconstruction of Germany, Italy and Japan.[3] The Civil Affairs Division, composed of citizen-soldiers and civilians, provided a myriad of services to rebuild these societies. The CA Division used experts in civil administration, public education, health services, public security and other specialties that provided the basis for post-war reconstruction. These reconstruction and stability operations succeeded in transforming these nations from dictatorial societies to vibrant democracies with free market economies. After the war, civil affairs continued to be part of the conventional Army and contributed significantly to other American conflicts including Korea, Vietnam, and Grenada.[4] In past conflicts, the Army employed CA to conduct stability and reconstruction operations, and in the case of Viet Nam, on combating an irregular enemy through population centric operations as conventional forces.

Between the late 1980s to the early 1990s, CA units were re-assigned to Special Operations force structure. The assignment is attributed to the Nunn-Cohen Act, included in Title 10 Section 107 (4)(2)(j) that states:

> "For purposes of this section, special operations activities include each of the following insofar as it relates to special operations: (1) Direct action; (2) Strategic reconnaissance; (3) Unconventional warfare; (4) Foreign internal defense; *(5) Civil Affairs*; (6) Psychological operations; (7) Counter-terrorism; (8) Humanitarian assistance; (9) Theater search and rescue; and (10) Such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense."[5] This paragraph from the law is often misinterpreted or misapplied to justify the position that Civil Affairs forces are special operations forces (SOF).

> However, a closer examination of this section indicates that it does not deal with force structure *per se*, but instead it refers to specific activities—and limits those activities as "special operations" (not SOF) only when they relate to special operations. This is a restrictive provision, not an encompassing one.[6]

Regardless, the assignment of Civil Affairs force structure as part of SOF did not change Civil Affairs functions. Civil Affairs forces engage the civil component of the battlefield by coordinating with civilian organizations, government organizations (from local to international) and military forces.[7] Engagement with civilians is the bedrock of CA. Interactions with civilians, coordinating civil-military activities with the various organizations coupled with the application of CA functional specialties are population centric functions necessary to stabilize or rebuild a society.[8] Functional specialty skills like rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare among others are abilities that neatly coincide with stability, security transition and reconstruction (SSTR) lines of operations.[9] It is difficult to understand why these functions are considered by some as solely the purview of "special operations."

Based on Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's official inquiry, "Why is CA SOF?,"[10] DA and the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) worked to find a solution to the Secretary's question. In 2006, Department of Defense concurred with USSOCOM and DA's recommendation to split the CA force between AC and RC with the AC remaining within SOF and the reserve within the general purpose forces (GPF). The shift was due in large part because USASOC was finding it difficult to mobilize, train and deploy the reserve CA force and requested USSOCOM to shift these units to the Army Reserve since the latter organization is best suited to conduct these functions and at the same time meet the Secretary of Defense's (SecDef) intent. The split however did not answer the Secretary's basic question: So what is the difference between CA support to SOF or the GPF?

The difference between active component SOF CA and its reserve component GPF counterpart is minimal since both execute the same functions with two minor differences: 1) the SOF CA force is on airborne status and is capable of supporting early entry operations; and 2) the SOF CA is exclusively composed of CA generalists. The AC CA generalists are capable of arriving first and conduct preparation activities that support the later entry of the RC CA units. Upon arrival, the RC CA forces apply their specialized expertise and focus their efforts on the commander's prioritized civil-military operations (CMO) projects. While CA generalists support maneuver units at the tactical and operational levels of war, they may also support geographical combatant commanders in their theater IW campaign plans through Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) activities.[11] They have basic skills necessary to assist commanders by planning and coordinating CA operations (CAO) and CMO.[12] Active component generalists can support all campaign phases (shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize and enable civil authorities – phases 0 to 5 respectively); nevertheless, AC CA units normally do not remain in theater long enough to execute all the campaign phases because they must return and prepare to support future contingency operations and other deployments.[13] Generalists provide the civil, cultural and demographic picture for the commander during the *Seize the Initiative* and *Dominate* phases and coordinate with government, international and non-government organizations to ensure the latter's activities do not conflict with military operations.

Reserve CA forces are composed of both generalists and functional specialists and also have units on airborne status capable of early entry operations in support of conventional airborne units. Functional specialists have the skills necessary to rebuild the affected nation. Their skills hail from civilian professions that give them the ability to export their expertise as soldiers for stability operations. Reserve CA civilian functional skills directly support the stability lines of effort of: establishing rule of law, reestablish essential services, further the economic or infrastructure development and facilitate regional and local governance.[14] Reserve CA forces can also support campaign phases 0 to 5 and are no longer limited to a post-conflict force.

As demonstrated above, both AC and RC CA functions are population-centric and conventional. The SOF-assigned CA forces may support SOF units in the latter's mission, but their activities are conventional in nature. The problem for GCC commanders is that if they require CA support they must send their request for forces (RFF) to both USSOCOM and U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). The GCC may require CA support for either TSC activities or a specific contingency, yet their request must be vetted through two separate commands. This is an inefficient business practice. To alleviate this situation, DoD and DA should have a policy to designate Civil Affairs as a conventional capability and assign all Army CA forces (AC and RC) to Forces Command, similar to the practice of the other military Services (for example, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps Civil Affairs units are considered part of their conventional forces and not designated by these services as special operations). This will align all DoD CA forces under USJFCOM and give the Department the ability to employ civil-military teams, "including their command and control relationships, composition, resourcing, and interoperability for steady-state and surge activities to support irregular warfare."[15]

When determining the impact of this decision – the process might include a discussion of CA support to the SOF requirements. An alternative may include retaining the AC CA brigade support SOF missions as requested by USSOCOM through the RFF to USJFCOM and coordinated through the global sourcing conferences. This will require the AC brigade to maintain its airborne status for support both SOF and conventional airborne formations.

Civil Affairs has always been a customer based combat support capability able to conduct population centric operations regardless of C2. Yet, splitting Civil Affairs between Army components and SOF/GPF lines had strategic consequences that caused turmoil in generating more Civil Affairs specialists and reduced the Army's ability to provide a total force sourcing solution for Iraq and Afghanistan. Splitting the CA force in time of war is a decision that violated the principle of unity of command. It appears that special operations did not want to lose all its organic CA capability but wanted to push the difficulty of deploying reservists to the Army Reserve. Unfortunately, it seems no one asked the harder question at the time, that being "Should AC CA functions remain solely the purview of the SOF community?" Such an examination may have provided a more comprehensive solution that gave DoD the necessary tools to execute irregular warfare missions. We are not too late—in an era of persistent conflict—to conduct such an examination and be prepared to make the hard—but necessary—decisions.

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[1]Colonel Norman Cotton of the Department of the Army Directorate for Reserve Component Integration, interview by author, 16 September 2009, Washington, D.C. Colonel Cotton previously worked as a the Assistant for Civil Affairs Policy in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict and Irregular Warfare (OASD SO/LIC (IW)). [2]Ibid. [3]U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), "History of Civil Affairs," briefing slides with scripted commentary, Fort Bragg, USAJFKSWCS, date not given. [4]Ibid. [5]*Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces,* Title 10, sec. 167. [6]Colonel (Retired) David Mitchell of the Civil Affairs Association, interview by author, 10 March 2009, Washington, D.C. [7]U.S. Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations,* Field Manual 3-05.40 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 29 September 2006), 1-6 U.S. [8]Department of Defense, *Report to Congress on Civil Affairs* (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, 29 April 2009), 4. [9]Ibid., 1-9. [10]U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Review: "Let's talk about whether or not all the Civil Affairs ought to be in SOF. I am inclined to think not," memorandum for the Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. 12 January 2004. [11]*Report to Congress on Civil Affairs,* 6. [12]FM 3-05.40, 1-8 – 1-9. [13]U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations,* Field Manual 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 27 February 2008), 3-21. [14]Ibid., 6-13 – 6-14. [15]*Report to Congress on Civil Affairs,* 9.

New! PKSOI in the News!!!

"CSIS Critical Questions"

Critical Questions is a short analysis prepared by CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) experts. They are a quick and easy read designed to get to the heart of the matter. The links provided below will feature two *Critical Questions* answered by: CSIS/PKSOI's Mr. Nathan Freier.

Topic: Defining and Operationalizing "Balance" in Defense Strategy

Q1 : What is "Balance" in the contest of Defense Strategy?

Q2: Why is increased precision in the definition of "Balance" so critical now?

Q3: Are there other views about "Balance" on the table?

For the answers to these 'Critical Questions" and to read more from Mr. Nathan Freier please follow the link below to the Center For Strategic and International Studies

Also from Mr. Nathan Freier,

Commentary: Mainstreaming—A Problem of Classification?



When "big Defense" and "big Army" talk about stability operations they are not always speaking the same language. Indeed, the principle challenge to "mainstreaming" a common conception of stability operations inside DoD is overcoming fundamental and unrecognized disagreements about what the term encompasses in the first place. In general, there are two competing camps.

cont. →

The first sees "stability operations" as a general label for a distinct set of complex contingencies such as intervention, opposed or unopposed stabilization and counterinsurgency (COIN), post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian relief, and peace operations. They collect all resource-intensive military operations undertaken in response to human insecurity; failed, fragile, or threatened political order; and intrastate conflict and identify them as stabilization. Some of these involve combat. The most demanding will. The second camp views stability operations as a subcomponent of a larger and more comprehensive "full spectrum" operational box. This view captures the "civ-mil" functions performed by U.S. forces in all operations — regardless of intensity — and places them alongside more traditional activities like offense and defense. Not surprisingly, the former camp is largely populated from within the policy and academic communities and the latter by the more conservative institutional military.

The fundamental point of confusion appears to be one of classification. In short, the two camps wrestle unknowingly over a simple question: are there discrete military contingencies — occurring under a range of demanding operational circumstances — that can and should be classified by themselves as archetypal "stability operations?" Is, for example, the term "stability operations" an umbrella concept describing the principle operational focus and objective of some interventions — i.e., stabilization? Or, alternatively, are "stability operations" subordinate elements of the general "full spectrum" rubric, as suggested in Army doctrine? If the answer is "yes" to the former question, then six years of OIF (post-May 2003) is one example of an extended opposed stability operation. If on the other hand, the latter is true, then OIF from March 2003 to the present represents a long "full spectrum" operation within which U.S. and coalition forces performed various tasks, including but not limited to stability operations.

The distinction is not insignificant. The former view draws a bright and unmistakable line under a universe of large-scale, less traditional contingency missions and tells "corporate" DoD that these are as likely and important (if not likelier and more important) than any other scenarios currently sitting on defense contingency planners' radar screens. The latter view leaves defense preparation for the most demanding stabilization environments again vulnerable to "lesser included" status.

COIN has been rationalized into the mainstream but a range of other complex stabilization contingencies have not. There is a lingering tendency, for example, for many inside DoD to view stability operations exclusively through the "post-conflict" lens. In this view, COIN is distinct — i.e., "stabo with an enemy." All other stabilization challenges are viewed as more benign and, by implication, less important.

This point of view suits the bureaucratic positions of key "stabilizers" like the Army and Marine Corps. The more future operating environments are painted as "emerging from" and not "in the midst of" conflict, the likelier it is for senior defense and military leaders to assume away a range of essential non-military stabilization functions to an aspirational corps of expeditionary civilians. Strategic, operational, and fiscal realities indicate this assumption would be dead wrong. Big (and/or violent) stabilization is the core business of defense.

The policy community has created much of the confusion. By implication then, it is best postured to clean up the mess most effectively. Currently, policymakers alternate usage of the term "stability operations" freely between the two perspectives outlined above. DoD *Instruction* 3000.05 (DoDI), for example, calls stability operations "military missions, tasks, and activities…to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief." The earlier DoD *Directive* 3000.05 (DoDD) was more circumspect. It defined stability operations as, "Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in states and regions."

In both cases, the term "stability operations" is a "general label" and a "subcomponent" of larger military endeavors depending on perspective. Further, a now famous pronouncement common to both the DoDI and DoDD identifies stability operations as "a core U.S. military mission," requiring DoD to be equally prepared and postured for it and "combat" operations as a consequence. This seems to imply that the two — stability and combat — are distinct operational types. "Combat" might be read as "traditional" combat or "major combat operations" (MCO), whereas "stability" operations might be seen simply as different and more "irregular" forms of war involving a more nuanced combination of military and non-military capabilities from the outset — again, opposed and unopposed stabilization, COIN, "armed nation-building", etc. Both the DoDI and DoDD also mission the department, in so many words, to "conduct", "support", and "lead" stability operations under a variety of demanding operational conditions. This again implies that "stability operations" are both component parts of larger operations, as well as standalone operations themselves.

Policy pronouncements like DoDI and DoDD 3000.05 should ultimately drive doctrine. And, in the case of stability operations, they have. However, Army doctrine writers have naturally interpreted policy and written doctrine according to a "stability operations" narrative that most conforms to long standing military culture.

Army doctrine enshrines stability operations as discrete components of current and future military actions. In execution in the field, these components are aggregated together with more traditional "offensive" and "defensive" tasks. And, this aggregation results in a "full spectrum" whole. In this view, there is no such thing as a "stability operation" by itself, only stabilization activities occurring within a larger contingency "full spectrum" context.

In practice — outside the world of military doctrine, most defense and military professionals recognize stability operations as a distinct category of complex contingency demands requiring its own service and joint focus, training, readiness, and investment. I tend to agree and believe the defense establishment would do itself a favor by consistently employing the term "stability operations" in this context. In the process of doing so, DoD should also finally and irrevocably unify a whole family of complex, defense-relevant contingencies under this revised stability operations rubric. Many of these both have a great deal in common but also until now have been considered unhelpfully distinct in policy, strategy, strategic planning, doctrine, and concepts. There will be more on this below.

This view actually takes its primary cue from past doctrine on "Military Operations Other Than War" (MOOTW). It is, after all, no accident that current doctrine on "stability operations" replaced MOOTW — right down to its numbered designation (Joint Publication 3-07). MOOTW was admittedly too broad for universal doctrine development. A more expansive view of "stability operations" is not.

In a 1995 Parameters article, James T. Quinlivan advances a simple and parsimonious definition of "stability operations." It appears to hold up today as well. He argued that stability operations were actions "in which security forces (combining military, paramilitary, and police forces) carry out operations for restoration and maintenance of order and stability." He further qualifies this by arguing that their aim is "[creating] an environment orderly enough that most routine civil functions [can] be carried out." This is all very general but nonetheless useful for capturing like contingencies under a common policy and doctrine home. Today, if one accepts that stability operations occur 1) in environments defined by fragile or failed indigenous order or a loss of local control over key security and political outcomes; 2) pervasive human insecurity; and/or 3) tactical to operational circumstances ranging from somewhat hostile and semi-permissive to violent and non-permissive, then aggregation of all the prospective military responses to these conditions makes a great deal of sense.

Toward this end, I would nominate the general category of "stability operations" as a new natural intellectual service, joint, and interagency home for foreign military contingencies that respond to disorder and internal conflict, human insecurity, and/or indigenous in- or under-capacity. Three of the five missions currently collected under the irregular warfare (IW) rubric fall within this new classification — COIN, foreign internal defense, and IW's conception of stability operations. So too would a number of sensitive, resource-intensive demands that in the past were classified as "peace enforcement." I would not, however, use the term "peace enforcement" as their distinguishing quality and instead would demonstrate their unique contribution to defense of core U.S. interests.

These "peace enforcement" missions include: "restoration of order and stability"; "protection of humanitarian assistance"; "guarantee and denial of movement"; "enforcement of sanctions"; "establishment and supervision of protected zones"; and "forcible separation of belligerents." The now dated doctrine of "peace enforcement" is useful to contemporary stability operations discussions in that it describes simultaneous military responsibility for the discriminating use of military force alongside effective employment of non-military capabilities and resources. Finally, I would suggest that the new family of stabilization contingencies also includes rare U.S. involvement in classical peacekeeping as well.

COIN has run amok. Unfortunately, recent fixation on COIN has dampened wider discussion on the gamut of stability operations demands. COIN has become an all-consuming intellectual fiefdom, artificially identified as distinct from the broader collection of likely stabilization contingencies. In reality, minimum essential "stabilization" will be a legitimate strategic objective in future U.S. interventions. Pursuing that objective will require unique defense-led, whole-of-government responses under a variety of operational conditions. Direct U.S. involvement in COIN is one and only one example of an opposed stability operation. Indeed, it may be the rarest manifestation. There are a number of other opposed and unopposed stabilization contingencies on the horizon. DoD would be well-advised to recast them all under a single parsimonious heading that lends itself to common approaches to strategy development, contingency planning, operational understanding, and doctrine.

Mr. Nathan Freier *a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., a visiting research professor at the U.S. Army War College's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, and a former Army strategist with experience in Iraq.*

New at PKSOI...

[1] Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction, No. 3000.05, Subject: Stability Operations, September 16th, 2009, Available from: http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf, Accessed October 14th, 2009. [2] Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive, No. 3000.05, Subject: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, November 28th, 2005, Available from: http://www.usaid.gov/policy/cdie/ sss06/sss_1_080106_dod.pdf, Accessed: October 15th, 2009. [3]Department of Defense, September 2009. [4] See Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication 3-07: Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), 16 June 1995, Available from: http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp3_07.pdf, Accessed: October 15th, 2009, p. I-1. An apt description of what is intended here can be found in joint doctrine on MOOTW. It defines war as "**large-scale**, **sustained combat operations** to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, placing the United States in a **wartime state**." [5] See Anthony H. Cordesman, Armed Nation Buidling: The Real Challenge in Afghanistan, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2007, Available from: http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/071107_afghanchall.pdf, Accessed October 15th, 2009. [6] Department of Defense, September 2009.[7] See JCS, 1995. [8] James T. Quinlivan, Force Requirements in Stability Operations, Parameters, Winter 1995, Available from: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/1995/quinliv.htm; Accessed: October 15th, 2009. [9] Ibid. This qualification seems to account for provision of "essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief" that are described in the current policy definition of stability operations. [10] Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-23: Peace Operations, December 1994, Available from: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm100_23.pdf, Accessed: October 15th, 2009, p. 6. Ibid, pp. 7-12.

New! New Book Reviews on the PKSOI Website



Measuring What Matters in Peace Operations and Crisis Management
Author: Sarah Jane Meharg
Senior Research Associate, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre
McGill Queen's University Press
ISBN 978-1-55339-228-6 (Pbk)

Review by Mr. William Pullen

Originating as a multi-phase research project in 2007-2009, the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre has funded research that provides a useful contribution to the literature on performance measurement and evaluation. The book will be of most interest to practitioners and evaluators looking to better understand different approaches to the measurement of resources, effects and impacts in peace operations and crisis management.

The book is in three parts. Part One has five chapters that provide a clear and helpful survey of language, methods, and tools. Part Two has nine chapters of practitioner contributions on applied measurement challenges. A concluding Part Three summarizes emerging trends and reviews policy and applied challenges in performance measurement and peace operations.

To read Mr. William Pullen's complete review: click here



The Punishment Of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban
Author: Sarah Chayes
Publisher:
Penguin Group, USA
ISBN: 9780143112068

Review by PKSOI's COL John Bessler

For anyone interested in an educated and experienced view on the reasons why Afghanistan is the way it is, and why Afghans act – maddeningly – the way they act, Sarah Chayes' The Punishment of Virtue is a must-read. I commend it to any military professional; moreover, to any civilian interested in the background to many of the current crises currently underway in that restive and troubled country.

It is recent history entwined with an autobiographical account of her relationship with key players in Kandahar City, and her observations, growing awareness and understanding of the truly deep-running nuances of Afghan behavior, motivations, and needs. Her knowledge base comes from her four years in country, the majority spent living in a mud-walled compound in Kandahar first as an NPR reporter, then working with an NGO. Her relationship with the Kandahar Chief of Police, one of the very few men of altruism she meets there, is the connecting thread for the entire story. To read COL Bessler's complete review: click here

PKSOI ViewPoints

Planning for Diplomatic Engagement

27 August 2009

by Elena L. Brineman, USAID Senior International Development Advisor , U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

SUBJECT: Planning for Diplomatic Engagement

Diplomats do plan!

When I talk about "diplomatic planning" I am talking about planning for political or diplomatic engagement. By political/ diplomatic engagement I am talking about the engagement between a USG official and an official of another country, or in the case of public diplomacy the people of another country, to influence them in a way that will help achieve US objectives and interests. Diplomatic engagement can be in a national forum (host nation) or international forum (coalition, UN, OECD/DAC etc.). Diplomatic or political engagement can be carried out in a formal or informal setting and is often done in both. While State Department personnel routinely plan for and carry out diplomatic/political engagement this function is also carried out by other USG officials, USAID in development policy dialogue, DoD in working with foreign militaries, trade negotiators, commerce department officials, etc. I will focus my remarks about planning on what I have observed with State and US Embassies as the Embassy process is "interagency" by nature.

While clearly State Department personnel are very involved at the policy formulation level, diplomatic engagements, other than Presidential Summits and Secretary of State meetings, are usually at the "operational level", i.e. carrying out or making policy operational. I will use the Embassy level planning as an example of what I have observed.

Planning for Diplomatic Engagement at the Embassy Level:

Some characteristics of political/diplomatic engagement:

- Most time and effort is focused on clearly identifying and interpreting US interests and foreign policy objectives for the country or situation at hand. Usually is done collaboratively by Chief of Mission (COM) and Country Team on an annual basis. Updates and adjustments are usually annual but interests and objectives are normally pretty constant unless there is a radical change in the country or region.

- General approaches or lines of effort for furthering the US interests and foreign policy objectives are identified and articulated. Usually is done collaboratively by COM and Country Team on an annual basis.

Planning for specific engagements along the identified general lines of effort is usually continuous, rapid and short cycle in response to the actions of the country leaders or people you are trying to influence. Usually this is done by a senior officer (Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), ECON/Political Officer, USAID Director, military commander) and a small group of key supporting senior officers drawn from the Country Team.

Country Plan or Strategy Development and Implementation:

US Interests and Foreign Policy Objectives: US Ambassador and Country Team clearly identify and interpret US interests and foreign policy objectives as they apply to the country at hand or the region if we are dealing with a region (i.e. Central America, Horn of Africa, etc.). A good deal of time and energy is spent on this. Basic US interests and foreign policy objectives for relations with a country, region or international entity are usually redefined and interpreted on an annual basis or when the situation in the US or with the foreign entity changes substantially (new administration, sudden,

unexpected change in governance, natural disaster, widespread violent conflict.) Usually has a relatively short term outlook – 1-3 years. This then gives you the framework for your diplomatic engagement and answers the question of what we (USG) are specifically trying to achieve with this country over the next year or two. This is most often articulated in a Chief of Mission Statement. Adjustments are made annually because you are almost always dealing with a highly dynamic and complex situation when you are dealing with other sovereign countries. Your aim is to influence the country – you cannot control it.

Lines of Effort: The COM and Country Team then decide the general lines of effort they are going to carry out to achieve each of the identified objectives, i.e. 1) use of one-on-one diplomatic engagement by Ambassador or other top diplomats with the Ambassador focusing his/her principle messages on the top (i.e. four) priority issues; 2) use of public diplomacy carried out by "given officials" in these ways; 3) bring in these top level US officials (i.e. Treasury Secretary) to deliver "these specific messages" to the country leaders and/or people at "these key event driven points" in the year; 4) promote formation of a working group of interested country embassies to carry out joint policy dialogue with the country on a priority issue, i.e. corruption, bank oversight, drug trafficking, dealing with gangs; 5) use US foreign assistance in these general ways to achieve our objectives; 6) sponsor trade delegations to or from the US to enhance economic ties; etc.

Individual Diplomatic/Political Engagement: Planning for individual engagements occurs on a continuous, rapid, short cycle basis. These political/diplomatic engagements can be triggered by the Embassy in moving the US agenda forward, a Washington request, or by something that happens in the country. Examples of routine political/diplomatic engagements to advance the agenda along a line of effort: the Ambassador will meet with the President to bring up "these three issues;" the DCM will have a lunch for women political leaders to discuss "these issues and send these messages;" the USAID Director will meet with the Chief Justice to discuss "these issues" in moving forward with a justice sector reform program. Examples of Washington driven engagements: Washington sends a demarche to ask the country to support a particular position in an international forum. Examples of those driven by the country: a president or prime minister is deposed by a military or civilian take over; the country's leader removes the Chief Justice in a non-constitutional way: the country takes a position against a US position on a critical issue in an international forum; etc.

Usually the senior officer responsible for the particular engagement will pull a small group of key people, often from across the Country Team, together to plan for the engagement or engagements. If the plan is in response to a major action by the host government the senior officer is likely to be the Ambassador or DCM and the resulting plan might include multiple engagements: the Ambassador will meet with the President; the Public Affairs Officer will draft an OP-ED for the Ambassador to run in the paper; the USAID/Director will meet with democracy or rule of law promoting local civil-society groups concerned about the government's actions; the Defense Attaché or MilGroup Commander will meet with the host country military leaders; etc. Each of these engagements also require plans – i.e. talking points will be drawn up, participants in the meeting will be identified, etc.

This type of ("tactical level") planning goes on constantly, occurs rapidly on short notice, and is short cycle. However, it is always done with a view to protecting US interests in the country and furthering US foreign policy objectives.

While I have focused on the Embassy/Country Team as an example, the same type of process is carried on at the Washington level in engaging with the international community on either a world or regional basis.

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SOLLIMS

In December, 2008 PKSOI initiated our lessons learned program with the implementation of SOLLIMS – the Stability Operations Lessons Learned Information Management System (http://www.pksoi.org). SOLLIMS is an online, globally accessible lessons learned system whose audience includes US Department of Defense agencies and major commands/units, other USG agencies – e.g. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability Operations (S/CRS), US Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of Agriculture, International Organizations (IO), Non-Government Organizations (NGO), academia and the private sector. SOLLIMS provides open access to the entire Peace and Stability Operations community.

PKSOI has been developing SOLLIMS' content both through original input from P/SO practitioners as well as through dedicated efforts to review and extract key observations, insights, lessons (OIL) and Best Practices from existing reports, case studies, other significant research sources and from major, strategic level exercises – e.g. Blue Advance 08, Austere Challenge 09, PKO Americas 09.

The following are examples of "Observations and Recommendations" (O&Rs) available within SOLLIMS:

Topic. Ensuring CIV-MIL Integration & NGO Input in USG Peace & Stability Operations

Observation. Despite recognition by USG civilian agencies, the military, and NGOs of each others' importance in achieving peace and stability in conflict zones, significant obstacles remain to their cooperation. Understandable differences in mission and culture lie behind these obstacles. Nonetheless, given the emerging consensus that none of these actors operates in a vacuum (when in a Peace and Stability Operations context), practitioners at all levels should strive to cooperate across communities, whenever doing so does not compromise their core principles. Developers of training and doctrine especially can set a strong example, by ensuring civil-military integration and understanding of NGO roles in their products and processes.

Discussion. The civilian, military, and NGO communities may in theory agree on cooperation, but in practice, differences between their respective cultures and missions can intervene, especially in the field.

Within the USG, civilian agencies coordinating with the military face the handicaps of fewer resources, lower float capacity, and lack of a planning culture. In the field, an NGO's interactions with the USG--especially the military--have the potential to compromise the NGO's neutrality and safety. Thus in Peace and Stability Operations (P/SO), a coordinated effort among external actors is often hampered by complex relationships and the fear of putting a "uniformed" face on civilian and NGO activity. Developers of training and doctrine should recognize these as challenges to overcome. Leveraging interagency contributions and accepting NGO concerns are critical to the USG's success in P/SO, in which the U.S. military continues to bear most of the burden for planning and implementation. "Nothing in the Army's roles and missions for SO is as challenging as the need to integrate civilian and interagency expertise into planning and operations, and that integration is critical to the Army's capacity to fulfill almost all of its other missions." (CPT A. Heather Coyne, Army Stability Operations Roles and Missions, *PKSOI Bulletin*, I, 3) Likewise, "the existing and emerging U.S. government and military policy and doctrine reflect an appreciation of both the tangible as well as the intangible benefits of NGO community contribution to the stabilization efforts. Security permitting, they are an essential part of the reconstruction and stabilization process, especially at the local level." (Roy Williams, "Stability Operations" and NGOs: What's in a Name? *PKSOI Bulletin*, I, 2) Cooperating across communities early--well before civilians, the military, and NGOs deploy to a given crisis--is one approach to addressing civil-military and USG-NGO differences. Two examples are instructive in this regard. First, exercising the Interagency Management System (IMS, a framework for whole-of-government planning and implementation of P/SO) teaches military and civilian officials to work jointly.

To View the complete O & R (observation and recommendation) and to view others please follow the link:

Go to complete O&R